

# Thermo-Attack Resiliency: Addressing a New Vulnerability in Opto-Electrical Network-on-Chips

**Abstract**—Optical Network-on-Chip (ONoC) has recently emerged as a power- and latency-efficient solution to improve the performance of Multi-processor System-on-Chips (MPSoCs). ONoCs take advantage of optical communications to transfer a bulk of data with much lower energy consumption compared to their electrical counterparts. However, the temperature sensitivity of optical routers might be exploited by adversaries to conduct thermal attacks on the optical components of such MPSoCs. In this paper, for the first time, we exploit this vulnerability and define a thermal attack on optical and electro-optical MPSoCs. According to our evaluations, the proposed thermal attack can be conducted under various scenarios and has the potential to alter the functionality of an MPSoC by inducing a range of malicious activities, including 1) Packet misdelivery, drops, and losses, 2) Data errors in normal and secure packets, and 3) Putting the network in a deadlock situation. In addition to the thermal attack, this paper also proposes an efficient countermeasure based on a stochastic source routing of secure packets, making it challenging for the adversary to track and attack the packets. Our evaluations confirm that the proposed countermeasure effectively protects MPSoCs against thermal attacks.

**Index Terms**—Opto-electrical network on chip, Thermal variation, Security, Routing algorithm, Microring resonator

## I. INTRODUCTION

Increasing the complexity of modern System-on-Chips (SoCs) has pushed the designers to integrate components and devices from other vendors, namely third-party intellectual property (IP) [1]. Although these IPs may be useful, they can probably be a source of security concerns such as Hardware Trojans (HTs) that snoop on and manipulate sensitive information on the chip [2]. Data leakage, information manipulation, and denial of service are possible outcomes of the HTs once inserted in modern SoCs [3].

Nowadays, in many Multi-Processor SoCs (MPSoCs), inter-processor data transfers are handled using electronic networks-on-chip (ENoCs) that use packet-based data exchange between on-chip routers that interconnect modules of the SoC. This architecture brings significant improvements over conventional bus and crossbar architectures by applying computer network theories and methods to on-chip communications [4].

However, recent developments in complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) circuits have stimulated the integration of optical components within SoCs [5]. The optical networks-on-chip (ONoCs) offer ultra-high bandwidth, low latency, and low power dissipation, all of which make them a promising alternative to ENoCs [6]. Some serious challenges of ONoCs include overheads for optical/electrical conversions,


laser integration complexities, reliability challenges, and security concerns [7], [8]. The hybrid opto-electrical NoC seems to be an interesting solution for achieving the benefits of both technologies while alleviating their disadvantages [9], [10].

From the security point of view, both ENoC and ONoC face the challenge of thermal and process variations [11], [12]. The NoC's performance e.g., the communication latency, throughput, and energy can be impacted by such variations. For example, as the chip's temperature rises, the network delay increases, network leakage power increases, and communication channels' bandwidth degrades [11], [13].

In this paper, for the first time, we use temperature variations as a security vulnerability in order to attack hybrid opto-electrical NoCs. We show that the vulnerability can be misused by an adversary to hijack the network and steal sensitive information. Then, based on the special characteristics of these topologies, we propose a novel routing solution to protect hybrid opto-electrical NoCs against the proposed attack. The main contributions of the paper are as follows:

- We identify a novel security vulnerability for hybrid opto-electrical network on chips. The vulnerability takes advantage of the electrical component of the chip to implement a novel attack on the optical routers of the chip under three different scenarios. Although the introduced attack does not directly intervene with the optical components of the chip, it can severely impact the security and privacy of such components and the entire chip.
- We introduce a novel countermeasure to address the attack. The countermeasure is based on a secure stochastic routing that hides the generator's information to protect against one of the attack scenarios. In addition, the proposed countermeasure works with the encrypted destination address that helps protect against the other two scenarios of the attack.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the necessary background of network model, on-chip optical data transmission and security threats. Section III discusses thermal variation effects that lead to possible attacks on the opto-electrical network on chips. Section IV reviews how the proposed method can be used as a countermeasure. Section V presents simulation experiments and analyzes the results obtained. Section VI summarizes the related works and eventually Section VII concludes the paper.



(a) On-chip optical transmission

(b) Malicious or malfunctioned modulator/detector MR

Fig. 1: DWDM optical data transmission and the threat of malicious/malfunctioned MR




Fig. 2: Cluster-based hybrid opto-electrical on-chip network

## II. BACKGROUND

Combining the advantages of two electrical and optical on-chip data transmission paradigms can provide a hybrid opto-electrical NoC. Transmission of optical stream for long-distance destinations (inter-cluster) and electrical packets for local destinations (intra-cluster) can significantly improve the performance of these networks [9], [14], [15]. Figure 2 depicts the cluster-based hybrid opto-electrical network applied in this paper. As discussed in [10], the cluster size has direct impact on the performance of the network. Processing elements (PE) and electrical nodes are located in the bottom layer, and the optical layer is located in the top layer. Temperature variations due to activities in bottom layer have direct impact on the optical layer temperature through thermal spreading model. In this model which is based on the heat spreading angle, the heat is propagated vertically and horizontally according to Fourier's law [16].

In the electrical domain, packet switching is applied, while in the ONoC domain, optical circuit switching is used. When

communication is needed between two PEs, NI will send a "path-setup" packet to the electrical router. After receiving this packet, the electrical router injects it into the electrical network and establishes an optical path for later data transmission whenever an optical path is required. Optical paths allow bulk data to be sent end-to-end without the need for halfway buffers, arbitration or other processing. Similar to many other researchers, in this paper, we consider mesh-based Crux optical router with modifications for WDM-enabled network [17].

In the optical domain, signals are modulated at a specified wavelength(s). One widely used example the Microring Resonators (MRs) that modulate optical signals using electrical signals. In this modulation, an array of photodetectors converts the optical signals into equivalent electrical signals after they have been multiplexed into a single optical waveguide [18].

In MR technology, the resonant wavelength is highly sensitive to the thermal condition of the chip. To mitigate the effects of temperature and fabrication-induced variations, microring resonators should be tuned accordingly i.e., by applying

external current or heat (thermal tuning) to the MRs, their effective refractive index can be adjusted [19]. MRs are tuned electrically and/or thermally in ONoCs through a separate tuning circuit. A similar circuit can be used to turn on and turn off the MRs as needed. However, such tuning circuits are the most vulnerable part of the device when it comes to the security of the chip. For example, the tuning circuit can be altered by a malicious hardware (hardware Trojan), to tamper with the resonant wavelength of ring resonators. An example of a malicious MR is shown in Figure 1b at which the malicious MR is partially turned on. In this case, the malicious modulator will draw some power (or the entire power) from the wavelength of the data carrying signal. This will lead to corrupted data since optical '1's can be altered into '0's due to power loss. Alternatively, the malicious detector (Figure 1b) can be tuned to filter out only a small part of the passing wavelength and drop it on the photodetector to dump the data. In this way, the waveguide data continues to travel to its target detector for legitimate communication despite the small amount of filtered power. The data from the waveguide can be snooped by malicious detector MRs without being altered, thus posing a major threat to photonic links.

To be more accurate, according to Equation 1, when an optical stream is passed through an MR, its phase shift is a multiple of  $2\pi$  [20].

$$m \times \lambda_{MR} = 2\pi R \times n_{eff} \quad (1)$$

where  $\lambda_{MR}$  is known as the vacuum resonant wavelength,  $R$  is known as the bending radius of the ring,  $n_{eff}$  is known as the effective index of the resonator, and  $m$  is a positive integer constant. Based on the initial resonant wavelength at the nominal operating temperature, i.e.,  $T_0$ , the relation between the resonant wavelength of an MR and the ambient temperature can be stated as Equation 2.

$$\lambda_{MR} = \lambda_0 + \rho_{MR} \times (T - T_0) \quad (2)$$

where  $\rho_{MR}$  is the coefficient of the MR's resonant wavelength shift that varies with temperature.  $\rho_{MR}$  can be measured by the Equation 3 where in this equation, for example the approximate value of  $n_g$  for optical waveguides at 1,550nm is 4.63.

$$\rho_{MR} = \frac{(\lambda_0 \times \delta n_{eff})}{n_g} \quad (3)$$

$\delta n_{eff}$  is the thermo-optic coefficient of effective refractive index, which is lower than silicon refractive index [21]. The authors of [13] have shown that MR resonant wavelength is linearly related to temperature variation. According to Equation 3, a 5nm in resonance wavelength shift occurs as a result of a 55°C temperature change. As the number of channels increases in DWDM systems, the thermal impact

becomes more significant as the wavelength width of each channel decreases. Also, as the temperature increases between 300 and 400 K, the optical power loss of an MR increases monotonically [22].

### III. THE PROPOSED THERMAL ATTACKS

In this section, we explore how the thermal vulnerabilities of ONoCs can be exploited in various scenarios to compromise users' privacy.

According to our evaluations detailed in this section, an adversary can conduct the thermal attack according to any of the following three scenarios to either drop or steal the data which is labeled private. The root of the attack is the thermal sensitivity of ONoCs (described in Section II). According to the proposed attack model, the attack agent tries to overload an area of the network to overheat certain optical routers to shift the routers' working wavelength. Such intentional congestion serves the attacker to conduct wavelength changes on the optical routers such that the altered router accesses the data which it was not meant to otherwise. The following scenarios focus on how the thermal vulnerability can be exploited to compromise the security and reliability of ONoCs.

- **NACK Replay (Attack Scenario-1):** An attacker attempts to pinpoint the information's source and deploys a number of NACK packets to the designated source router. Such a NACK replay attack is based on the fact that the NoC implement a handshake process in an end-to-end manner. The NACK replay will lead to a rise in network traffic within the designated area, potentially increasing the local or overall chip temperature. Ultimately, this elevated temperature can trigger a wavelength change in the victim ONoC routers.
- **Packet Drop (Attack Scenario-2):** If the attacker cannot locate the source address of a packet, they may devise to drop a portion of the packet to force the destination to send a NACK to the source i.e., the application of a fault injection attack to conduct the ONoC thermal attack.
- **False Traffic Injection (Attack Scenario-3):** The attacker can directly work on injecting massive false traffic to break or congest an area of the network to violate the thermal boundaries of the victim ONoC router(s).

We conducted system-level simulations to study the feasibility of the attack scenarios mentioned above. Figure 4 illustrates the temperature changes in the optical layer of an 8 × 8 network, which is being attacked under Attack Scenario-1. In this instance, we executed a 3600-cycle thermal attack (Scenario-1) on the optical layer of a hybrid network. Notable to mention that we have not done any tampering with the optical layer, we only conducted NACK replays in the electrical layer and recorded the temperature profile of the optical layer accordingly. The results demonstrate that




Fig. 3: Temperature variation during approximately 3600 cycles of attack conducted on an  $8 \times 8$  network under a moderate traffic rate

TABLE I: Observed outcomes of the thermal attack on the baseline network

Attack	Traffic	Packet Drop	Data Error	Mis-Delivery	Packet Loss	Deadlock
Scenario-1 6x6	Low	57	1341	43	38	2
	Moderate	79	1575	69	72	3
Scenario-2 6x6	Low	43	1182	39	41	3
	Moderate	57	1379	91	83	4
Scenario-3 6x6	Low	50	998	46	40	2
	Moderate	64	1256	70	79	5
Scenario-1 8x8	Low	29	870	30	20	1
	Moderate	37	1439	61	46	3
Scenario-2 8x8	Low	26	826	29	37	2
	Moderate	41	1335	78	51	5
Scenario-3 8x8	Low	30	981	34	59	3
	Moderate	49	1016	59	67	4

the attack can increase the temperature of the network to a large extent, resulting in the wavelength change in the optical routers. We have repeated the thermal attack for the other two scenarios and observed the same outcome i.e., significant wavelength shift in optical routers. The attack has affected the network significantly as reported and summarized in Table I. In the rest of this section, we discuss the observed results and the outcomes of the performed attacks under each scenario.

**Outcome-1 (Packet Loss):** If the packet's type is tampered with during an attack<sup>1</sup>, it can result in one of the two outcomes. Firstly, the tampered packet might be dropped from the network as routers may not recognize the packet's type. This case was observed in the  $6 \times 6$  network, where about 5000 cycles of attack resulted in 46 cases of packet loss under the low traffic condition. As the size of the network increases, more packets may be at risk of such a drop as a result of the thermal attack.

Secondly, the packet may get stuck in the buffers of NoC

<sup>1</sup>The packet type information is stored in the header of each packet

TABLE II: Temperature profile of the chip during the attack

Traffic Type	$\Delta T$ during attack ( $^{\circ}C$ )		Average temperature during attack ( $^{\circ}C$ )
	Minimum	Maximum	
Low	17	38	114
Moderate	24	55	127.5
High	38	160	171.65
Very High	47	210	209.83

routers and occupy the buffers indefinitely. As we show later, this outcome may lead to congested areas in the network and increase the power/thermal profile of the chip.

**Outcome-2 (Mis-delivery):** If the attack tampers the destination address field of a packet, the packet will be forwarded in the wrong path and will be delivered to a wrong core (we called this situation packet mis-delivery). Although such packets eventually exit the network, the actual application that is waiting for them will never receive them. According to the logs shown in Table I, we have observed 34 packet mis-delivery cases for the  $8 \times 8$  network when we conducted the attack in 7000-cycle period.

**Outcome-3 (Data Error):** The most common outcome of a thermal attack is the tampering of the body of packets, which can lead to errors in non-control data flits of packets. In Table I, it is shown that this is the most frequent outcome of the attack, with significant numbers of data errors observed in various experimental settings.

**Outcome-4 (Fake Packet):** Assume a packet consists of 10 flits: 1 header, 8 data, and 1 trailer flit. If one of the data flits (say the 5<sup>th</sup> flit) is tampered by a thermal attack so that its type changes from data into header flit, then the network will treat the second part of the packet (flits 5 to 10) as a new packet. This means that the original packet will now be divided into two incomplete packets, each with a






Fig. 4: The format defined for secure packets allows stochastic source routing without having source and destination information within the packets

length of 5 flits. Interestingly, our experiments have confirmed that attackers could achieve this rare condition by repatriating thermal attacks.

**Outcome-5 (Global Deadlock):** If the attacker has a chance to enforce a good number of lost packets or create a number of fake packets, some flits may remain un-handled in buffers of the NoC i.e., the flits occupy the buffers forever. If the number of such flits increases, they may end up in a global deadlock that infects all parts of the network. Our experiment confirms this situation and we see that in  $6 \times 6$  and  $8 \times 8$  networks with at least 5000, and 7000 cycles of attacks respectively, we could enforce a global deadlock.

#### IV. COUNTERMEASURES

In this section, we discuss our proposal to address the thermal vulnerability and its related attack scenarios. The main idea here is to utilize a stochastic source routing methodology that routes messages stochastically among a number of route options. This countermeasure, indeed, hides the packets' routing information, preventing attackers from conducting a successful thermal attack, as they will not be able to identify the target optical router. The effective feature of the countermeasure is that it adjusts the chances of selecting alternative routes depending on the network condition, response time, and thermal and security profile of the routes.

##### A. Stochastic Secure Routing

Using stochastic source routing, packets can choose from a number of routes to reach the destination node based on their security profile [23], [24]. A secure packet will be routed stochastically among  $XY$ ,  $YX$ , or optical paths using secure routing. The probability of picking alternate routes is stored in three registers which will be updated as needed<sup>2</sup>. Initially, for inter-cluster communications, optical routes are given a higher probability than other routing algorithms.

By the selected strategy, the shortest path will be calculated and embedded in the header of a secure packet. The source and destination addresses of a secure packet are not disclosed within the path information. To maintain packet security and prevent the exposure of source and destination details, three routing alternatives (so-called  $L1$ ,  $L2$ , and  $L3$  paths) are available for secure packets. The probability of selecting each route

<sup>2</sup>Information from thermal sensors, packet waiting times, and security priority is used to update the probabilities.

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#### Algorithm 1 Secure Routing

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**Input:** Strides  $S_1, S_2$ , Directions  $D_1, D_2, D_3$ ;  
**Input:** Encrypted Source Destination Address  $E_S$ ;  
**Input:** Encrypted Destination Address  $E_D$ ;  
**Input:** Router Address  $R$ ;  
**Output:** Selected Output Channel  $Out_{Channel}$ ;

```

1: if ( $E_D == E_R$ ) then
2:    $Out_{Channel} = Local$ ;
3: else
4:   Set  $Next_{VC} = Current_{VC}$ ; #1 for  $XY$ , 2 for  $YX$ 
   and 3 for Optical packets.
5:   if ( $S_1 \neq 0$ ) then
6:      $S_1 \leftarrow S_1 - 1$ ; and  $Out_{Channel} = D_1$ ;
7:   else if ( $S_2 \neq 0$ ) then
8:      $S_2 \leftarrow S_2 - 1$ ; and  $Out_{Channel} = D_2$ ;
9:   else
10:     $Out_{Channel} = D_3$ ; # After reaching the peer optical
    router, the packet will be ejected from the Optical
    Network to its destination.
11:  end if
12: end if
13: Return; =0

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(respectively,  $P_{L1}$ ,  $P_{L2}$ , and  $P_{L3}$ , where  $P_{L1} + P_{L2} + P_{L3} = 1$ ) is used by the path computation algorithm shown in Algorithm 1. According to this process, which takes place at the network interface unit of each router, a path will be computed and stored in the header of a secure packet. The three routing options for secure packets are detailed below.

- 1)  **$L1$  Path:** Packet headers include a  $XY$  path toward the destination with turn-last through the electrical layer. These types of packets will remain in the electrical network until they reach their destination.
- 2)  **$L2$  Path:** The  $YX$  path to the destination with turn-first is embedded in the packet's header meaning that the packet start its path through the  $Y$  direction.
- 3)  **$L3$  Path:** A wavelength-based circuit-switched optical path through the optical layer. Secure packets will be ejected to the *Optical* network if the path is selected and will be injected into the electrical network when the destination is reached by the peer optical router.

As outlined in Algorithm IV-A, the packet type is set, and the source ( $E_S$ ) and destination ( $E_D$ ) addresses are encrypted, updating the corresponding fields in the packet. In line 3, the algorithm computes the horizontal, vertical, and layer differences between the source and destination nodes. The algorithm then employs a stochastic selection process to select one of the three routing alternatives to generate the path.

Path generation for  $L1$  and  $L2$  includes both real and

misleading turns, while  $L3$  generates a path that may contain either a misleading turn or a path through the optical network. In the  $L1$  subroutine (lines 6-12),  $S_1$ ,  $D_1$ , and  $D_2$  are computed deterministically based on the source and destination coordinates. However,  $S_2$  and  $D_3$  are chosen randomly to mislead potential attackers regarding the packet's destination.

$L2$  (lines 13-20) follows a similar concept but gives priority to vertical movement over horizontal. Conversely, in  $L3$  (lines 21-22), the packet is directly sent to the optical network, and the variable  $m$ , representing the number of hops to the peer optical router destination, is initialized. This approach increases the likelihood of bypassing a malicious router in the electrical router's path if the conditions are favorable for choosing this route.

### B. Deadlock Freedom

Incorporating optical routing for secure packets in its raw form can create a cyclic dependency between NoC buffers. To avoid this issue, we have devised two virtual channels (VC), namely  $VC_1$  and  $VC_2$ , with specific allocation policies, same as mentioned in [23]. Both VCs are available for normal packets at the source. However, once assigned to a VC, a normal packet cannot switch between the two VCs during its journey. The allocation of VCs to normal packets is based on the traffic conditions at the source node. For secure packets, the routing algorithm enforces specific restrictions when acquiring VCs, depending on the routing scenario adopted for each secure packet. Secure packets are allocated to VCs based on the following policies.

- When a packet travels through a secure path designated as  $XY$ , it is limited to using only  $VC_1$ . To enforce this policy, the source node initiates the transmission of the packet into the network with  $VC_1$ . Once assigned, this VC, it will be used for the entire journey of the secure packet.
- A secure packet with path  $YX$  uses only  $VC_2$  until destination. Likewise, this policy is enforced by the network interface unit at the time of path computation.
- A secure packet that uses an optical route starts its journey on  $VC_1$  and continues along this route until it reaches the second turn, which is the turn from  $Y$  to  $X$ . At this point, the packet needs to switch over to  $VC_2$ . This means that the packet switches to  $VC_2$  when it returns to the direction of  $X$ , where its actual destination is located.

## V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To assess the effectiveness of the proposed security countermeasure, we conducted two types of experiments. Firstly, we used Access Noxim [25] NoC simulator to simulate the behavior of a NoC-based MPSoC equipped with our proposed

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### Algorithm 2 : Secure Path Computation

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**Input:** Source & Destination Address Plaintext  $P_s, P_d$ ;  
**Output:** Encrypted Source & Destination Address  $E_S, E_D$ ;  
**Output:** Strides  $S_1, S_2$ , Directions  $D_1, D_2, D_3$ ;  
**Output:** Packet type  $X_{bit}$ ;

- 1:  $X_{bit} \leftarrow 1$ ;
- 2:  $E_D \leftarrow HB-2(P_d)$ ;
- 3:  $\Delta X = P_d.X - P_s.X$ ; and  $\Delta Y = P_d.Y - P_s.Y$ ;
- 4: Set  $Current_{VC} = 1$ ; # Initial VC for all paths except  $YX$
- 5: Goto L1, L2, or L3 with a probability distribution of  $P_{L_1}$ ,  $P_{L_2}$  and  $P_{L_3}$  s.t.  $P_{L_1} + P_{L_2} + P_{L_3} = 1$ ;  
**L1: (an XY path)** # Path with real and misleading turns
  - 6:  $S_1 \leftarrow abs(\Delta X)$ ;
  - 7:  $S_2 \leftarrow Rand(n)$ ; and  $D_3 \leftarrow Rand(X^+, X^-)$ ; # To mislead the attacker
  - 8: **if** ( $\Delta X \geq 0$ ) **then**  
 $D_1 \leftarrow X^-$ ; **Else**  $D_1 \leftarrow X^+$ ;
  - 9: **end if**
  - 10: **if** ( $\Delta Y \geq 0$ ) **then**  
 $D_2 \leftarrow Y^-$ ; **Else**  $D_2 \leftarrow Y^+$ ;
  - 11: **end if**
  - 12: **Return**;
- L2: (a YX path)** # Path with real and misleading turns
  - 13:  $S_1 \leftarrow abs(\Delta Y)$ ;
  - 14:  $S_2 \leftarrow Rand(n)$ ; and  $D_3 \leftarrow Rand(Y^+, Y^-)$ ; # To mislead the attacker
  - 15: Set  $Current_{VC} = 2$ ; # Initial VC for  $YX$  path
  - 16: **if** ( $\Delta Y \geq 0$ ) **then**  
 $D_1 \leftarrow Y^-$ ; **Else**  $D_1 \leftarrow Y^+$ ;
  - 17: **end if**
  - 18: **if** ( $\Delta X \geq 0$ ) **then**  
 $D_2 \leftarrow X^-$ ; **Else**  $D_2 \leftarrow X^+$ ;
  - 19: **end if**
  - 20: **Return**;
- L3: (an Optical path)** # Path contains optical route
  - 21:  $m \leftarrow RandBetween(0, \Delta OP - 1)$ ;
  - 22:  $S_1 \leftarrow abs(\Delta OP) - m$ ; # Takes the remaining  $m$  hops once ejected from the optical network
  - 23: **Return**;

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method. The results of this experiment are presented in the following two sub-sections.

#### A. Security Evaluation

We conducted network-level simulations to evaluate the security of the system against these attack scenarios. According to our countermeasure (see Section IV), packets in the




Fig. 5: The duration of cycles required for a successful thermal attack (a) and the attack performance impacts on the average network latency in 6 × 6 (b) and 8 × 8 (c) networks.

TABLE III: Observed outcomes of the thermal attack on the protected network

Attack	Traffic	Packet Drop	Data Error	Mis-Delivery	Packet Loss	Deadlock
Scenario-1	Low	0	0	0	0	0
	Moderate	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario-2	Low	0	0	0	0	0
	Moderate	6	79	0	3	0
Scenario-3	Low	0	0	0	0	0
	Moderate	8	106	6	7	0
Scenario-1	Low	0	0	0	0	0
	Moderate	0	0	0	0	0
Scenario-2	Low	0	0	0	0	0
	Moderate	1	21	3	6	0
Scenario-3	Low	0	0	0	0	0
	Moderate	5	137	8	6	0

simulation environment are divided into two types: secure and non-secure. Secure packets use a method specified in their header to determine their route, whereas non-secure packets are routed deterministically using  $XY$  or  $YX$ . The simulation is conducted on  $8 \times 8$  and  $6 \times 6$  networks with a second optical layer, over 100,000 cycles with a 10% warm-up period. The delay for the optical link is calculated using a formula that can be found in [14]. Table I shows the effectiveness of the countermeasures against attacks for each scenario. As it can be seen from Table III, the proposed countermeasure successfully protects the network against the introduced thermal attack under all possible scenarios. This achievement is obtained as the proposed countermeasure prevents attackers from identifying the source of a packet that helps protect against NACK attack. Additionally, the stochastic source routing ensures that if an adversary attempts to resend the message from the same source, the packets will follow a different path and evade capture i.e., if a path becomes congested or thermal sensors detect high temperatures in an area, the path will be diversified.

### B. Network Performance Evaluation

Performing a thermal attack on the network can have a significant impact on network performance in both normal and secure modes. In the case of a  $6 \times 6$  network, the average delay can be observed in Figure 6a, while for an  $8 \times 8$  network, it

TABLE IV: Area and dynamic power consumption overheads of the proposed security system compared to the baseline router and the baseline 16-core MPSoC.

		Silicon Area ( $\mu\text{m}^2$ )	Dynamic Power ( $\mu\text{W}$ )
Baseline	Baseline (Router)	65,972.70	268.5
	Baseline (16-Core MPSoC)	1769364.2	2704.6
Stochastic source Routing	Proposed (Router)	85,263.50	428.9
	Overhead w.r.t Baseline (Router + NI)	29%	159.7%
	Proposed (16-Core MPSoC)	1,799,443.30	3017.1
	Overhead w.r.t Baseline (16-Core MPSoC)	1.7%	11.6%

is shown in Figure 6b. Our proposed method prioritizes the transmission of secure packets, resulting in a reduction in the average delay of secure packets, as depicted in Figure 6.

### C. Hardware Evaluation

Our proposed method was verified using Verilog HDL and synthesized with synopsis DesignCompiler™ tool to estimate its hardware overhead. This tool uses 45nm Nangate library ASIC technology. In our design, the baseline NoC is comprised of four virtual channels per physical channel, each with a depth of eight buffers and a 32-bit data width. To implement the proposed system, the NI and router of the MPSoC have been modified to include the components as listed below.

- In order to maintain a secure path for packets that use secured source routing, a module has been implemented in each router. With this module, the router can divide packets into two types - secure and normal. The packets are then routed using a specified routing algorithm discussed in Section IV.
- There are three registers at each router that hold the probability of each path for future routings of secure packets. Routing scenarios for the source routing will be updated based on this module.

The results of the synthesized hardware for a 16-core MPSoC are shown in Table IV. The first tab shows the




Fig. 6: Average network latency of secure packets, non-secure packets, and mixed of both for  $6 \times 6$  (a) and  $8 \times 8$  (b) networks under different rates of secure packets.

baseline router and MPSoC for 16-Core without any additional components. The second tab shows the overall architecture outcome along with the suggested security system. As shown in the table, the area overhead of the securing system affects the router by a 29% increase, and the dynamic power of that router is increased by 159.7%. Our security system has just 1.7% overhead according to the whole MPSoC, and this increase is about 11% for dynamic power.

## VI. RELATED WORK

The authors in [26] several security challenges in NoC design in electrical, wireless, and photonic domains are discussed, along with some promising solutions. An overview of remote denial of service attacks caused by hardware Trojan insertion and timing channel attacks was presented in [27]. In addition, they showed that two types of remote attacks can also be effective in PNoCs. A hybrid wavelength and mode division multiplexing PNoC was also designed for the first time with countermeasures designed to protect against threat models. They also discussed new potential threats that might affect the 3D PNoC safety.

Rani et al. [28] implied that using a high-power signal, an attacker can inject a gain competition attack into ONoCs, robbing legitimate signals of amplification, thereby initiating a gain competition attack in ONoCs. As a security threat to ONoCs, gain competition attacks have been investigated for the first time in their proposed approach. A model of the attack was developed and its effects on the performance of optical NoC were analyzed. They also proposed strategies for detecting attacks and countermeasures for mitigating them. A new end-to-end security protocol was created by Bashir et al. [19] for on-chip optical networks that is impervious to replay, eavesdropping, and message spoofing attacks. Their scheme also exploited optical network properties to reduce the effect of cryptographic operations' long latency

ONoCs are vulnerable to hardware trojans that manipulate electrical driving circuits to cause MRs to spy data from neighboring wavelength channels of a shared photonic waveguide. In this way, a serious security threat is introduced. The SOTERIA framework was presented by Chittamuru et al. [29] as a way to protect data in PNoC architectures from snooping attacks using process variation based authentication signatures. DWDM-based PNoCs can be enhanced with reservation-assisted security enhancements at the architecture level. Based on crossbar-based PNoC architectures, the authors in [30] combined circuit- and architecture-level schemes into SOTERIA framework.

Zhou et al. in [22], [31] examined tampering and snooping attacks during the thermal sensing through micro-ring resonators in ONoCs. In ONoCs, they examined tampering and snooping attacks during the thermal sensing through micro-ring resonators. To verify and protect thermal sensor data for attacks using optical sampling and electronic transmission, a new structure for the anti-HT module was proposed based on the workflow and attack model provided. To further enhance the high-level control of the security statuses of the networks, the authors developed a detection scheme based on spiked neural networks (SNNs).

## VII. CONCLUSION

Hybrid opto-electrical Network-on-Chip combines optical and electrical communication technologies to facilitate high-speed data transfer and reduce power consumption. The hybrid approach leverages the strengths of both optical and electrical communication while addressing their respective limitations. However, the thermal sensitivity of optical components in a hybrid system can be exploited to pose security risks to the chip. This paper, for the first time, studies the feasibility of such thermal attacks on hybrid Network-on-Chips. We introduced three variations of the thermal attack and observed



a wide range of severe outcomes, ranging from packet drops and losses to packet mis-delivery and causing the entire network to enter a deadlock condition. The paper also proposed a novel source routing methodology to counter the attack. The proposed routing makes stochastic decisions based on the network's security profile and thermal condition. This method effectively protects the chip against almost all thermal attacks. In our future work, we intend to analyze normal traffic alongside the attacker's network traffic using deep learning approaches to further enhance network security.

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