DUA: Detection of Unrecognized Applications Using One-Class SVM in NoC-Based SoCs

Andrea Galimberti1, Katsuaki Nakano2, Rohan Purkait2, Amlan Ganguly2, Michael Zuzak2, Mark Indovina2, Sai Pudukotai Dinakarrao3, William Fornaciari1, Davide Zoni1
1Politecnico di Milano, 2Rochester Institute of Technology, 3George Mason University


Abstract

Unrecognized applications running on multi-core SoCs may signal system compromise and increase vulnerability. This paper introduces DUA, a novel methodology to detect the execution of unrecognized software applications on NoC-based multi-core SoCs, leveraging traffic data from the NoC interconnect, or, more broadly, any packet-switched on-chip or interposer-level interconnect such as a network-in-package. DUA embeds lightweight traffic-monitoring counters into selected routers of the interconnect, and it carries out detection using a one-class support vector machine (OC-SVM) that, due to its unsupervised-learning nature, is trained only on recognized applications, i.e., applications authorized to run on the system. This allows the DUA methodology to effectively detect unrecognized, never-before-seen applications, including those not considered during training. Identifying the optimal OC-SVM involves exploring a search space that encompasses input features, kernel functions, and hyperparameters. An extensive experimental campaign demonstrates the effectiveness of the methodology in detecting unrecognized applications from the PARSEC benchmark suite on a 16-core NoC-based SoC. The DUA approach achieves an average accuracy of 85.9% while introducing negligible area and power overheads and not affecting timing, and it shows resilience to queuing-delay noise, indicating generalization across varying traffic conditions.