Read disturbance phenomena, such as RowHammer and RowPress, are well-known causes for data corruption in DRAM memories, which have been shown to constitute ex- ploitable security vulnerabilities. Indeed, both phenomena alter the memory locations nearby a row that is targeted by an attacker, potentially leading to writing data in memory locations that should not be accessible by her. In this work, we take a constructive point of view on the read disturbance phenomena. Observing that the data alteration patterns depend on the single device instance, we characterize them with the intent of building a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). To this end, we specifically analyze the repeatability of data alteration and the information content of the bitflip patterns in modern DDR5 DRAM memories. This analysis would also enable a PUF implementation fully contained within the DRAM module. Our experimental results on multiple DDR5 DRAM chips show that the bitflip patterns caused by read disturbances are remarkably stable when considering a single DRAM row, and are essentially independent across rows in the same bank, or across different devices. These results, combined with a significant information content coming from the unique bitflip pattern produced by a read disturbance, suggest that read-disturbance-based PUFs are promising candidates for future implementations.